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 Registration Taxes on Cars Inducing International Price Discrimination:  








Pre-tax car prices are particularly low in EU countries with high registration taxes but no car 
production, meaning that the tax is equivalent to an import tariff and induces international price 
discrimination. The paper develops a theorectical model to analyse the European Commission's 
policy of facilitating arbitrage and thereby reducing car price differences. The effects on prices, 
quantities and welfare depend crucially on whether the tax is exogenous or whether it is set 
optimally by the importing country. The optimal tax rate depends positively on the car 
manufacturers' scope to price discriminate. Thus when arbitrage costs fall, tax rates are reduced.  
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Non-Technical Summary 
The EU car market is characterized by large price differences. Pre-tax prices are particularly low in 
countries with a high registration tax on cars, which do not have a car manufacturing industry, meaning 
that an import tariff and a specific tax are equivalent. The tax is partially born by foreign car producers 
who set lower prices than in other countries, and thus introducing a tax may decrease import prices and 
increase welfare. The European Commission aims at reducing car price differences by facilitating 
arbitrage, for which pre-tax prices are relevant.  
The paper studies what effects it would have if this EU policy was successful. When markets become 
more integrated and arbitrage costs fall, the scope for price discrimination becomes smaller. As long as 
the tax rate is fixed, the decrease of the feasible price differences leads to a rise of the low pre-tax prices 
in the importing country, which reduces the volume of trade, and to a fall of the high pre-tax prices in the 
producing country. 
When the tax rate reacts to the smaller possibilities to induce low import prices and is set optimally by the 
importing country, a change in arbitrage costs has additional effects by altering the tax rate. Fostering 
arbitrage would lead to a reduction of the tax rates which would be welcomed by the European 
Commission as a step towards tax harmonization. The pre-tax price increases and the tax rate falls, and 
either effect on tax-inclusive may dominate. Thus, the tax-inclusive price and thereby the volume of 
imports depends non-monotonically on arbitrage costs. Moreover, for an intermediate range of the 
maximum price difference, the optimal adjustment of the tax implies that the price in the producing country 
is unaffected when the scope for price discrimination becomes smaller. In this case, the adjustment  takes 
place on the markets of the importing country only. Welfare effects depend on whether the tax rate is 
endogenous or exogenous, too. With an exogenous tax rate, price discrimination increases welfare 
although total quantity does not increase, which stands in contrast to the standard welfare result of Varian 
(1985). In contrast, welfare falls for a wide range of parameter values when the tax is endogenous, as the 
optimal tax rate increases when the scope to price discriminate becomes larger. 
 
 1 Introduction
Car prices within the European Union diﬀer substantially, and the price diﬀerence for an
identical new car may amount to several thousands euro. Pre-tax prices are particularly
low in countries with high registration taxes on cars, because the tax is partially born by
car producers themselves, which set lower prices than in other countries. For instance, in
the EU27, car prices are the lowest in Denmark where the registration tax is above 100%.
In Finland, which has the lowest pre-tax car prices in the eurozone, the tax amounts to
around 30%.1 In May 2006 the net price of an Opel Vectra was 21000 euros in Germany
to which only VAT has to be added. In contrast, the pre-tax price was only 15800 euros
in Denmark, but including the registration tax and VAT, a Danish consumer has to pay
more than 40000 euros for the car (see table 1).
Firms’ scope to price discriminate may be limited by the possibility of arbitrage. For
arbitrage within the European internal market, it is the pre-tax prices that are relevant,
as the tax rates of the country where the car will be registered apply. Thus although
a Danish consumer pays a much higher tax-inclusive price, German consumers would
like to buy their car in Denmark – which often means a re-import – and not vice versa.
Countries with high registration taxes on cars typically do not produce cars themselves,
implying that a speciﬁc tax cannot be distinguished from an import tariﬀ. Like a tariﬀ,
the tax may lower the import price and thereby increase domestic welfare at the expense
of foreign car manufacturers, and the ideas of optimal tariﬀ theory apply. It is this aspect
of registration taxes that is the focus of the paper.
Germany France Netherlands Finland Denmark
Pre-tax price 21000 18100 18000 17200 15800
Tax-incl. price 24300 21800 27300 29800 43200
Table 1: Pre-tax and tax-inclusive prices for an Opel Vectra, May 2006.
(Source: European Commission)
1Other countries with a substantial registration tax include the Netherlands, Ireland, Greece and
Portugal. Lutz (2004) has found a signiﬁcant eﬀect of registration taxes on pre-tax car prices. Further
empirical studies on European car prices include Brenkers and Verboven (2006), Ginsburgh (1985), and
Goldberg and Verboven (2001). Neither of these four studies include the high-tax countries Denmark,
Finland and Greece.
1The European Commission wishes to harmonize taxes within the EU and has suggested to
reduce registration taxes to low levels or to completely abolish them (European Commis-
sion 2002). The reasons given include that the they are an obstacle for the free movement
of passenger cars2 and that taxation of cars should be CO2-based. The European Com-
mission also aims to reduce the large price diﬀerences, as they run counter to the spirit
of the internal market. To foster arbitrage, it has introduced new rules for distribution
systems of cars in 2002, as the distribution systems were regarded to enable the car pro-
ducers to segment markets3. Since 2005, car dealers can also open additional outlets in
other EU countries. However, up to now price diﬀerences have only decreased slightly
(European Commission 2006, 2007).
This paper develops a theoretical model that analyses the eﬀects of the policy of the
European Commission to reduce price diﬀerences by enhancing arbitrage. The focus is on
price discrimination that is induced by registration taxes. For a ﬁxed tax rate, a fall in
arbitrage costs and thus a smaller scope for price discrimination leads to a decrease of the
high price in the producing country and to an increase of the low price in the importing
country. As a consequence, the volume of imports falls. Moreover, price discrimination
increases aggregate welfare, although total quantity remains constant, as it partially oﬀsets
the distortion from the tax. This result stands in contrast to Varian’s (1985) well-known
result, that price discrimination can only improve welfare if the total quantity increases.
Conversely, limiting the price discrimination by enhancing arbitrage reduces welfare.
When it is taken into account, that the tax rate may be changed in response to the
changing market conditions, these results are qualiﬁed. If the government of the importing
country sets the optimal tax rate to maximize domestic welfare, it will levy low taxes
when arbitrage costs and therefore viable price diﬀerences are small. The aim of the
European Commission that registration taxes should be reduced is then not achieved by
tax harmonization directly but indirectly by limiting the margin for price discrimination
by car producers and thereby constraining the importing countries’ possibility to induce
lower import prices by levying the tax.
Thus falling arbitrage costs that constrain price diﬀerences not only change prices directly
but have additional eﬀects by changing the optimal tax rate set. In particular, for a certain
range of arbitrage costs, the adjustment of the tax completely oﬀsets the initial eﬀect on
2One of the problems occuring in this context is that if a person moves within the EU and wants to
take her used car with her, this may result in double taxation.
3For details on the new rules for distribution systems of cars, see Brenkers and Verboven (2006).
2the price in the producing country. In this case, it is optimal for the government to set the
tax at a level such that the maximum possible pre-tax price diﬀerence is induced without
aﬀecting the prices in the producing country. From the point of view of the car producers,
none of the prices has fallen in the new equilibrium. In the importing country, the pre-tax
price increases, but as the tax rate falls, the tax-inclusive price falls and imports, total
quantity and aggregate welfare increase. This stands in contrast to the above-mentioned
result that for a given tax rate enhancing arbitrage reduces aggregate welfare.
If arbitrage costs fall when they are already small, the results are diﬀerent. The change in
the tax rate is too small to oﬀset the eﬀect on the price in the producing country, which
therefore falls. Likewise, the fall in the tax rate does not outweigh the increase in the
pre-tax price in the importing country any more, and the tax-inclusive price increases,
too. Thus, the price that consumers pay in the importing country - and therefore the
volume of imports - depends non-monotonically on the scope to price discriminate.
Annual car taxes, that may have similar eﬀects, are usually based on characteristics of
the car such as horsepower or fuel eﬃciency. In contrast, the high registration taxes are
generally levied ad valorem. However, the model cannot be solved analytically for the
case of an ad valorem tax. Therefore, in this paper per unit taxation is considered ﬁrst,
and subsequently, it is shown by numerical simulation that the results are the same for
both kinds of taxation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the model. Section 3 brieﬂy discusses
the case of an exogenous per unit tax rate, whereas the main part of the paper is in section
4 where the interaction of price discrimination and optimal taxation is analysed. Section
5 summarizes the results obtained for ad valorem taxation and section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
There are two countries. In one of them, one ﬁrm produces and sells the good, whereas
the other country imports it.4 Marginal costs c are constant. The importing country
4The results do not hinge on the assumption of a monopoly. It can be shown that the qualitative eﬀects
are the same when there are two symmetric ﬁrms in the producing country with Bertrand competition
in diﬀerentiated products as in Holmes (1989). Price diﬀerentiation may have fundamentally diﬀerent
eﬀects in oligopolies when there is best response asymmetry, i.e. when the strong market of one ﬁrm is
the weak market of the other one. This is not the case in the discussion of registration taxes, as all ﬁrms
would like to set the lower price in the same country. A survey on price discrimination in oligopolies can
3levies a consumption tax (for instance a registration tax) on the good that induces an
incentive for price discrimination.5 Demand in the producing country equals
X = a − bP, (1)
where X denotes quantity and P the price. In the importing country, the quantity is
denoted by x and the producer price by p. Demand depends, however, on the tax-inclusive
price ρ
x = α(a − bρ). (2)
Note that the parameters in the demand function are the same in both countries, apart
from the parameter α, that represents the relative size of the importing country.
Thus, without the tax, the monopolist would set the same price in both countries even if
he could set the prices separately. The only incentive for price discrimination comes from
the tax.
The tax may be levied per unit or ad valorem, i.e.
ρ = p + t or ρ = κp, (3)
where t > 0 is the per unit tax rate and κ > 1 represents an ad valorem tax with the
rate κ − 1.
Price discrimination may be limited by the possibility of arbitrage, for which the pre-tax
prices are relevant. Arbitrage is possible at costs s, which thereby is the maximum feasible
price diﬀerence the ﬁrm can sustain. If the price diﬀerence is higher than s, arbitrage
would take place and the ﬁrm would not sell anything at the high price, which cannot be
proﬁt-maximizing behavior. Arbitrage costs s should be understood as the cost-equivalent
of all barriers to arbitrage.6
be found in Stole (2007).
5In the producing country, a registration tax always lowers welfare and it is thus assumed that no
speciﬁc tax is levied. There is of course the normal VAT on cars in producing countries, but the focus of
this paper is on speciﬁc taxation, issues of tax competition refering to VAT are beyond the scope of the
paper. A survey on tax competition can be found in Lockwood (2001).
6The price diﬀerence can be higher than the actual transportation costs and reﬂects all obstacles for
arbitrage. For instance, consumers may have preferences to buy at their local car dealer, because they
might want to establish a good basis for the long-term relation of after sales services. It may also be
easier to make warranty claims at the car dealer where the car was bought, although car producers are
obliged to grant warranty that is valid in the whole EU).
4The government of the importing country sets the tax rate in an initial stage and aims at
maximizing welfare w measured as the sum of consumer surplus plus tax revenue, which






















2 − pα(a − bρ). (5)
The welfare of the producing country equals consumer surplus plus proﬁts of the ﬁrm, and









2 + pα(a − bρ) − c(a − bP + α(a − bρ)). (6)
Note that aggregate welfare equals the sum of gross consumer surplus in both countries
minus production costs


















2 − c(a − bP + α(a − bρ)). (7)











2 − cα(a − bρ) (8)








2 − c(a − bP), (9)
where e w and f W equal gross consumer surplus minus the production costs for the respective
quantity in the individual countries. Note that e w+f W = w+W, and that f W is the welfare
of the producing country without the proﬁts from exporting, which are instead added to
the importing country’s welfare. As long as the price is above marginal costs c, the welfare
aggregates e w and f W increase unambiguously, when the respective price ρ or P falls, and
vice versa.
7The monopolist’s proﬁts are included in the producing country’s welfare, i.e. it is assumed that the
ﬁrm is domestically owned.
53 Per unit taxation: exogenous tax rate
Segmented markets
When markets are segmented, the monopolist can set prices in the two countries inde-
pendently.
In the producing country, the proﬁt equals
Π = (P − c)(a − bP) (10)









The monopolist’s proﬁt in the importing country is
π = (p − c)(a − b(p + t)) (12)
























Thus half of the tax is born by the consumers in the importing country and the other half









Note that all prices are independent of the size of the importing country α and that the
equilibrium price in the producing country P ∗
seg does not depend on the tax rate t.
The quantity in the producing country is unchanged, whereas sales in the importing
country fall in response to the tax. It is straightforward to see, that the welfare in the
producing country W falls when a tax is introduced or increased, as f W remains unchanged
and proﬁts from exporting fall (as both the pre-tax price and the volume of exports fall).
Aggregate welfare w + W = e w + f W also depends negatively on the tax, as f W remains
unchanged and e w falls with the increase in the tax-inclusive price ρ. The impact of a
tax increase on the welfare of the importing country is ambiguous, depending on whether
the tax rate is below or above the optimal tax rate (see below section 4). These are the
well-known considerations and results of (optimal) tariﬀ theory.
6Arbitrage limiting price discrimination
Assume now, that arbitrage costs s are lower than the induced price diﬀerence 1
2t. In this
case, the monopolist is restricted in setting its prices, and the maximum feasible price
diﬀerence equals s. As the arbitrage condition is binding, the ﬁrm actually only sets one
price and P = p + s, leading to proﬁts of
Π
tot = (p + s − c)X + (p − c)x (16)
= (p + s − c)(a − b(p + s)) + (p − c)(α(a − b(p + t))) (17)


























This means for the price in the producing country
P
∗























and for the tax-inclusive price in the importing country
ρ
∗















Note that the eﬀect of an exogenous change in the tax rate on the pre-tax price p∗
s is
smaller than on segmented markets, but the price P ∗
s in the producing country is now
aﬀected by the tax, too. With these expressions, we can derive the following proposition
on prices, quantities and welfare when the scope for price discrimination changes.
Proposition 1: Assume that the tax rate is exogenous and the arbitrage condition
P − p ≤ s is binding.
When the scope to price discriminate increases, i.e. when s rises,
(i) both the pretax and the tax inclusive price p∗
s and ρ∗
s in the importing country fall
whereas the price in the producing country P ∗
s rises
(ii) the sales in the importing country rises, while the quantity in the producing country
falls and total quantity remains constant,
7(iii) welfare in the importing country and aggregate welfare increases. The change in
welfare in the producing country is ambiguous.
Proof: (i) follows directly from equation (19) to (22), and (ii) is a straightforward calcu-
lation inserting the expressions for the prices into the demand functions.
























as a − bρ = x > 0 in the relevant region and
dρ
ds
< 0 by (i).
Aggregate welfare is the sum of both countries’ gross consumer surplus minus production
costs,











































> 0 (as ρ > P)
For the welfare of the producing country W, the calculation is given in the appendix.
The results on prices and quantities correspond to the usual results on price discrimination.
When the ﬁrm has more scope for price discrimination, it decreases its lower price on its
weak market, and increases its higher price on its strong market, with the quantities on the
individual markets reacting accordingly. Due to the assumption of linear demand, total
quantity remains constant. The size of the eﬀects depends on the size of the importing
country α. The larger the relative size of a country is, the smaller is its share of price
adjustment to a change in s.
In the importing country, (more) price discrimination lowers the price, and both the
consumer surplus and the tax revenue - and thus welfare - increases. Consumers in the
8producing country lose due to the higher price, but the ﬁrm gains, as it has more scope to
move its prices towards the monopoly prices of the individual markets. It is ambiguous,
which eﬀect dominates.
The result on total welfare is surprising at ﬁrst glance. Aggregate welfare unambiguously
increases, although total quantity is constant. This result stands in contrast to the well-
known result of Varian (1985) that price discrimination can only increase welfare if total
quantity increases. The puzzle is explained by the fact that the importing country has the
low pre-tax price that is relevant for arbitrage and for price discrimination, but the high
tax-inclusive price that is relevant for consumers. Allowing for price discrimination makes
cars in the importing country cheaper and redistributes the quantity from consumers with
a lower to consumers with a higher willingness to pay.
Note however that the combination of the results that price discrimination increases wel-
fare and that the tax induces price discrimination does not mean that introducing a tax
is welfare improving. Allowing for price discrimination increases welfare if the tax is





s = a − bP
∗










and also decreases total welfare, as can be shown by straightforward, albeit tedious,
computation using equations (5) and (19) to (22).
4 Per unit taxation: endogenous tax rate
In this subsection, the tax rate is not considered as exogenous, but it is assumed instead
that the government of the importing country chooses the tax rate in order to maximize
domestic welfare, taking into account how the ﬁrm will react to the tax rate set. In
particular, it is analysed how the arbitrage condition aﬀects the optimal tax policy and
what eﬀects this has on prices, quantities and welfare. As a benchmark, the case of
segmented markets is again discussed ﬁrst.
Segmented markets
Using equation (13) and (14) on the equilibrium prices, the welfare of the importing


































































As markets are segmented, the price in the producing country is independent of the tax











and the diﬀerence of pre-tax prices, that is relevant for arbitrage, is
P
∗


















Arbitrage limiting price discrimination
When the possibility of arbitrage limits the ﬁrm’s scope to price discriminate, the above
result on the optimal tax rate does not hold any more. When setting the tax, the gov-
ernment of the importing country has to take into account that the price diﬀerence it






tax rate b tseg will no longer be optimal, and a lower rate will be chosen, as determined in
the following proposition.
10Proposition 2: (Optimal tax rate)
Assume that the government of the importing country sets the tax rate in order to max-
imize the country’s welfare.
(a) The optimal tax rate b t equals
(i) (interior solution)







(α + 2)(3α + 2)
+
2sα
(α + 2)(3α + 2)
, (35)
(ii) (corner solution)


















(i) Assume that the arbitrage condition is binding and thus P = p+s. To get the welfare
of the importing country as a function of the tax rate, insert the equilibrium prices for
a given tax rate (equation 13 and 14) into equation 5. Straightforward maximization
results in the optimal tax rate b t stated. It remains to check, whether for this tax rate,
the arbitrage condition limiting price discrimination is indeed binding. On segmented
markets, a tax rate e t induces a price diﬀerence of 1
2e t (equation 15), and thus the ﬁrm will
only choose prices such that P = p+s as long as s ≤ 1





b(α + 2)(3α + 2)
+
sα
(α + 2)(3α + 2)




giving the range of parameters for which the solution for the optimal tax rate is consistent.









. As long as the maximum feasible price diﬀerence s is at least as large
(i.e. as long as s ≥
a − bc
6b
), the arbitrage condition is irrelevant and the solution for







corner solution  
interior solution 
Figure 1: Regions for diﬀerent solutions for the optimal tax






, thus for s between these two boundaries,
neither of the two solutions applies. It is then optimal for the government to set the tax
rate such that it is just not binding. If the ﬁrm is unrestricted in its price setting, a tax of
b t = 2s induces a price diﬀerence of s, the maximum feasible one. A lower tax rate is not
optimal, as s would not be binding for the ﬁrm and thus increasing the tax rate would
increase welfare (as it moves in the direction of the optimal tax rate in case of unrestricted
pricing). On the other hand, a tax rate higher than b t = 2s also cannot be optimal, as in
this case s would be binding and lowering t marginally would increase the welfare of the
importing country (as t would move in the direction of the optimal tax rate under the
condition that P = p + s). 
The regions corresponding to the three cases of the theorem are illustrated in ﬁgure 1
showing the threshold for s as a function of the size of the importing country α. Figure
2 shows the optimal tax as a function of s, the maximum feasible price diﬀerence8.
When arbitrage costs s are large, the maximum price diﬀerence is not binding and the




the arbitrage condition becomes binding when the optimal tax for segmented markets is
8The parameters a, b and c only alter the scale. For the plots, the parameters a = 10, b = 1 and c = 4
where chosen. In ﬁgures 2, 3 and 4, α = 0.6 is assumed in addition
12set, and the government of the importing country has to take this fact into account when
it determines the optimal tax rate. For small s (as deﬁned in case i), there is an interior
solution for the optimal tax rate under the restriction of a binding arbitrage condition.
In this case, the prices in the two countries are linked by the condition P = p+s, and the
tax does not only have an impact on the prices in the importing country, but on the price
in the producing country, too (see proposition 2 below). However, when the size of the
importing country α is too small or s is too large, the tax rate derived in this way may be
so low that the price diﬀerence induced if markets were segmented would be smaller than
s and the condition P = p + s would not hold. Facing this tax rate, the ﬁrm would not
fully make use of its scope to price diﬀerentiate - but it would do so if the higher optimal
tax rate for segmented markets was set. In this case, the corner solution for the optimal
tax rate applies. The government sets the tax such that the arbitrage condition P −p ≤ s
is just binding for the ﬁrm, i.e. the price diﬀerence induced if markets were segmented is
exactly s.
Note that when markets become more integrated and thus the arbitrage condition binds
as s falls, there is no direct transition from the case of segmented markets to the case
of an interior solution for the optimal tax rate. There is always an intermediate interval
where the corner solution applies. The smaller the size of the importing country α, the
larger is the range of parameter values for s for which the corner solution, in which the
tax of the importing country does not aﬀect the price in the producing country, and the
interior solution for the optimal tax may apply only for a small range of parameter values
s.
The following corollary summarizes how the optimal tax rate depends on the maximum
feasible price diﬀerence s and on the size of the importing country α. In particular, part
(i) points out that in the corner solution, the optimal tax rate reacts much more strongly
to changes in s than in the interior solution (see ﬁgure 2).
Corollary:
(i) For s ≤
a − bc
6b
, the optimal tax rate b t depends positively on arbitrage costs s. In
the corner solution, the optimal tax rate reacts more strongly to a change in s than
in the interior solution, as in the corner solution
db t
ds
= 2 holds, whereas in the region




(ii) In the interior solution, the optimal tax rate b t depends positively on the size of the
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Figure 2: Optimal tax rate
(iii) As long as s > 0 or α > 0, the optimal tax rate is positive.






(α + 2)(3α + 2)
. It is straightforward to show, that the maximum of
db t
ds
for α ≥ 0 is smaller than 0.14.
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3. When s >
q
4




lower boundary can be found. 
As a next step, the equilibrium prices are considered when the arbitrage condition is
binding and the government of the importing country sets the optimal tax rate b t .
In the case of an interior solution for the optimal tax rate (as deﬁned in proposition 2(i)),
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Figure 3: Prices when the tax is set optimally
and the tax-inclusive price in the importing country is
b ρ
∗
s = b p
∗














These expressions are derived by inserting b t into equations 19 to 22.
In the corner solution, (as deﬁned in proposition 1 iii), the equilibrium prices equal the
respective prices for segmented markets (equations 13 and 14) for the tax rate b t = 2s. In












































From these expressions, the following proposition on the eﬀects of a change in arbitrage
possibilities on prices, quantities and welfare can be derived. Figure 3 shows the equilib-
rium prices as a function of arbitrage costs s, and ﬁgure 4 plots the aggregate welfare.
The cases of an interior solution for the optimal tax (corresponding to ”small values of
s”) and of the corner solution (corresponding to ”intermediate values of s”) are deﬁned
as in proposition 2.
15Proposition 3: Assume that arbitrage limits price discrimination in the sense that the
maximum feasible price diﬀerence s is binding if the optimal tax for segmented markets
is set (i.e. s <
a − bc
6b
). If the tax is set optimally, the following holds.
(i) The pre-tax price in the importing country b p∗
s depends negatively on s. The eﬀect
of s on b p∗
s is larger in the corner solution than in case of an interior solution for the
optimal tax rate.
(ii) The tax inclusive price b ρ∗
s depends non-monotonically on s, as it depends negatively
on s in case of an interior solution, but positively in case of the corner solution.
Accordingly, the volume of imports depends non-monotonically on s.
However, for b ρ∗
s=0 < b ρ∗
seg , i.e. if a uniform price has to be set, the tax inclusive
price is lower and thus the quantity imported is higher than on segmented markets.
(iii) b P ∗
s depends positively on s in case of an interior solution and is unaﬀected by s in
the corner solution. Thus in case of an interior solution, the quantity sold in the
producing country falls when s increases, and it is independent of s in the corner
solution.
(iv) As s rises, total quantity falls.
(v) As s rises, welfare in the importing country rises and welfare in the producing
country falls. In the corner solution, total welfare unambiguously falls. In contrast,
the change in welfare is ambiguous in case of an interior solution. It rises, when s
is close to 0, and it decreases, when s is close to the threshold (a − bc)
α
2b(3α + 4)
between the cases of interior and corner solutions.
(vi) The eﬀect of a change in s on aggregate welfare is much smaller in the interior
solution than in the corner solution. More precisely, for a given α the minimum of
the absolute slope
   
d(w + W)
ds
    in the region of the corner solution is more than 25
times as large as the maximum of the absolute value
   
d(w + W)
ds
    on the interval of
the interior solution.
In the following, these results will interpreted and discussed. The formal proof is given
in the appendix.
With an endogenous tax rate, a change in the scope to price discriminate has two eﬀects
– the direct eﬀect of an increase in s and the indirect eﬀect through raising the optimal
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Figure 4: Aggregate welfare when the tax is set optimally
tax inclusive price ρ, whereas the rise in the tax rate itself lowers p and increases ρ. For
p these two eﬀects reinforce each other, while for ρ they act in opposite directions. Note
that the tax rate reacts much less strongly to changes in s in the interior solution than
in the corner solution. This explains, why in the former case, the direct eﬀect dominates
and ρ falls in response to an increase of s, and in the latter case, the indirect eﬀect of the
tax increase dominates and ρ increases. In particular, the volume of imports x depends
non-monotonically on the scope to price discriminate (parts i and ii).
The direct eﬀect of an increase in s increases the price P in the producing country, whereas
the indirect eﬀect of the tax increase lowers it. In the corner solution for the optimal tax
rate, these two eﬀects exactly oﬀset each other and P is independent of s (part iii). In
fact, in the corner solution, the tax rate is chosen as the highest tax rate that does not
aﬀect P. In case of an interior solution, the direct eﬀect of the increase in s dominates,
thus P rises and the quantity X sold in the producing country falls. There is no direct
eﬀect of a change in s on total quantity x + X, but it falls due to the tax increase (part
iv).
Finally, welfare is considered in part (v) and (vi) of the proposition. As the binding
17arbitrage condition does not only restrict the monopolist in setting its prices, but also
constitutes a restriction for the government of the importing country on setting its tax
to inﬂuence the price setting of the monopolist, the welfare of the importing country
increases when s increases. In contrast, welfare in the producing country falls. In the
corner solution, the price P is unchanged, and the result of falling welfare is due to the
decrease in proﬁts from exports. In the interior solution, the price P increases and thus
f W, the welfare minus the proﬁt from exports, also falls.
In case of a corner solution, the aggregation leads to an unambiguous result: A larger scope
to price discriminate decreases total welfare. This can be easily seen by considering, that
P and therefore f W remain unchanged, whereas ρ rises and thus e w falls. In the case of an
interior solution, the change in total welfare is ambiguous. For s = 0, a marginal increase
in s increases total welfare. The intuition is that there nevertheless is a positive optimal
tax, and – similar to the case of an exogenous tax in proposition 1 – allowing for some
price discrimination redistributes the good to the market with the higher tax inclusive
consumer price and thus the higher (marginal) willingness to pay for the good. When
s is larger, the eﬀect of a falling total quantity dominates and total welfare falls, when
arbitrage costs s – and therefore the scope for price discrimination – rise. However, these
welfare eﬀects are small compared to the eﬀects in the corner solution (see ﬁgure 4).
5 Ad valorem taxation
When the tax is levied ad valorem, the model is no longer analytically tractable , as the
condition for the optimal tax rate is a polynomial of third degree in the case of segmented
markets and of fourth degree in the case of a binding arbitrage condition.
However, the numerical simulation using various parameter combinations show that the
qualitative results derived for per unit taxation also hold in the case of ad valorem taxation
In this section, these results are summarised.
5.1 Exogenous tax rate
Segmented markets
Facing an ad valorem tax in the importing country, the monopolist will set the following






































depends on the tax rate κ only via marginal costs c, and if c = 0, it would be independent
of the tax κ.
Arbitrage limiting price discrimination







, the two prices the ﬁrm sets are linked by P = p + s and the ﬁrm actually
only sets one price maximizing its proﬁts
Π = (p + s − c)(a − b(p + s)) + (p − c)(α(a − bpκ)), (47)

























seg + s =






From these expressions for the prices, quantities and welfare can be derived. All results
of section 3 as summarised in proposition 1 continue to hold for an ad valorem tax. The
price in the producing country and the pre-tax price in the importing country depend
negatively on κ, whereas the tax-inclusive price rises with the tax. A larger scope to price
discriminate, i.e. a larger s, lowers both the pretax and the tax-inclusive price in the
importing country, but increases the price in the producing country. Aggregate output
is independent of s, but depends negatively on the tax rate. Welfare in the importing
country and aggregate welfare increase, whereas the change in welfare in the producing
country is ambiguous (see appendix).
195.2 Endogenous tax rate
Segmented markets
When markets are segmented and the government of the importing country maximizes
welfare w (using the expression for the prices in equation (48) and (49), the ﬁrst order







−abκ2c − b2κ3c2 + b2κ2c2 + a2
bκ2 = 0 (51)
which is equivalent to the equation of 3rd degree
f(κ) = −κ








< 0 for all κ > 0 and f(1) = a(a − bc) > 0, this equation has a unique solution
b κseg with b κseg > 1, corresponding to a positive optimal tax rate, which is independent of
α.
Arbitrage limiting price discrimination
When the possibility of arbitrage limits the ﬁrm’s scope to price discriminate, the govern-
ment of the importing country has to take into account that it cannot induce diﬀerence
larger than s by setting its tax, i.e. that P −p ≤ s. Deriving the ﬁrst order condition for









using equations (48) and (49) leads to an equation of fourth degree with tedious expres-
sions of the parameters a,b,c,α and s as coeﬃcients and numerical examples have to be
used to derive further results. Details on the parameter values chosen for these simula-
tions are given in the appendix. As in the case of per unit taxation, an interior solution
and a corner solution have to be distinguished with the threshold value for s depending
on the size of the importing country α. The boundary between these two cases continues
to be concave as in ﬁgure 1.
In case of the corner solution, the importing country’s tax does not aﬀect the price in
the producing country and the optimal tax set induces a price diﬀerence such that the













Using this expression, prices are determined by equations (44) and (46), and quantities
and welfare can be derived. In the range of the interior solution, i.e. for small s, the
20optimal tax rate b κ as a function of the maximum feasible price diﬀerence s, has to be
derived numerically - implying respective functions of prices, quantities and welfare. The
simulation shows that all qualitative results of section 4, in particular those summarised
in the corollary of proposition 2 and in proposition 3, also hold for the case of an ad
valorem tax. The plots of the optimal tax rate, prices and welfare continue are similar to
ﬁgure 2 to 4.
In particular, the optimal tax rate b κ depends positively on s, and the slope of b κ as a
function on s is much larger in the corner solution than in the interior solution. This
diﬀering reaction of b κ on s explains the non-monotonic behaviour of the tax-inclusive
price ρ, which moves in the same direction as the pre-tax price p in the interval of the
interior solution and depends negatively on s in the interval of the interior solution,
but moves in the opposite direction and depends positively on s in the corner solution.
Aggregate welfare continues to depend non-monotonically on s in the interior solution,
but falls with s in the corner solution. However, as in the case of per unit taxation, the
eﬀect on aggregate welfare is much larger in the corner solution and the positive welfare
eﬀect of price discrimination for small s seems to be of limited relevance.
6 Conclusion
High registration taxes in countries without a car manufacturing sector are one reason
for the large pre-tax price diﬀerences observed on the European car market. These taxes
not only lead to high tax-inclusive prices but also induce foreign car producers to set
low pre-tax prices, resulting in welfare gains for the importing country at the expense of
producing countries. The European Commission aims at further market integration by
facilitating arbitrage and thereby making price diﬀerences smaller. The paper discusses
what eﬀects would occur if this policy was successful using a model in which the tax is
the only incentive for price discrimination.
When the government of the importing country chooses the tax rate optimally, a change
in arbitrage costs not only has direct eﬀects on prices by limiting the scope for price
discrimination, but it has additional indirect eﬀects by lowering the optimal tax rate.
From the optimization problem of the government to set the tax rate such that it maxi-
mizes domestic welfare, two types of solutions emerge – an interior solution that applies
for small arbitrage costs and a corner solution that is relevant for an intermediate range
of arbitrage costs (before arbitrage costs are so high that markets can be considered as
segmented). In the corner solution, the tax is set at a rate such that the condition that
21price diﬀerences cannot exceed arbitrage costs is just binding and the price in the pro-
ducing country is not yet aﬀected. Hence the whole adjustment to falling arbitrage costs
takes place on the market of the tax-imposing country. Only when the markets are highly
integrated already and arbitrage costs are so small that the interior solution applies, a
change in arbitrage costs also aﬀects the price in the producing country.
In any case, the low pre-tax price in the importing country increases when arbitrage costs
fall. However, in the corner solution the eﬀect that the optimal tax rate falls is so large,
that the tax-inclusive price falls in spite of the increase of the pre-tax price. In contrast, in
the interior solution the eﬀect on the optimal tax rate is small and thus both the pre-tax
and the tax-inclusive price move in the same direction, i.e. both increase, when arbitrage
is further facilitated. Hence, the tax-inclusive price – and thus the volume of imports –
depends non-monotonically on arbitrage costs.
Accordingly, the welfare result also diﬀer in the two cases. Due to the large fall in the
optimal tax rate in response to falling arbitrage costs, aggregate welfare always increases
when arbitrage costs are in range of the corner solution. In contrast, in the interior
solution, the welfare eﬀect is ambiguous, but relatively small. However, welfare in the
importing country always falls, as its scope to set an optimal tax to lower its import
price is further restricted. It is in the interest of the importing countries that high price
diﬀerences are feasible.
Thus the eﬀects of the policy of the European Union that aims at lowering the price
diﬀerences on the car market, substantially depend on whether the tax rate should be
considered as exogenous or whether (and to what extent) the high registration taxes will
be lowered in reaction to import price increases when markets become more integrated
and the ﬁrms’ scope to price discriminate becomes smaller.
22Appendix:
Proof of proposition 1, (iii)






















−(1 + α)(a − bc) + b(α + 2)(t − 2s)
(1 + α)
2
The ﬁrst term of the numerator is negative, whereas the second term is positive (as
s < 1




For s = 0 and a high (exogenous) tax rate, the expression is positive. It can be checked
that no inconsistencies occur (as e.g. negative expressions for prices or quantities) for a
tax rate that makes the numerator marginally positive.
Proof of proposition 3







(α + 2)(3α + 2)






(α + 2)(3α + 2)
=
4 + 4α
4 + 8α + 3α2 < 1 for α > 0, thus in the corner solution, the absolute value of the
derivative is larger.
(ii) The directions of change of b ρ∗




























3α2 + 4α + 2
b(α + 2)(3α + 2)
< 0
(iii) is obvious from from the expressions for b P ∗
s .
(iv) The reaction of total quantity x∗
s + X∗
s can be derived by inserting the expressions
for the prices into the demand functions. It can also be shown by the consideration, that
23the direct eﬀect of s on total quantity is 0 and the eﬀect of the tax increase is negative,
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(v) The eﬀects on welfare are derived by inserting the respective equilibrium prices into
the expressions for the welfare and diﬀentiating.
a) interior solution
Welfare in the importing country:
dw
ds
= 2((1 + α)(a − bc) + 2bs)
α
(α + 2)(3α + 2)
> 0




(8 + 22α + 20α2 + 5α3)(a − bc) + bs(32 + 64α + 40α2 + 9α3)
(α + 2)






α(2 + 2α + α2)(a − bc) − bs(16 + 32α + 28α2 + 9α3)
(α + 2)
2 (3α + 2)
2 T 0 (54)





α(2 + 2α + α2)(a − bc) − bs(16 + 32α + 28α2 + 9α3)
(α + 2)
2 (3α + 2)
2 > 0. (55)










(3α + 2)(α + 2)(3α + 4)
< 0. (56)
b) For the corner solution:











24Welfare in the producing country:
dW
ds







α(a − bc + 2bs) < 0. (57)
(vi) This part of the proposition compares the slopes
d(w + W)
ds
of the aggregate welfare
functions in the interior and in the corner solution.
For the interior solution,
d(w + W)
ds
depends negatively on s (equation 54) and it can
easily be shown that the largest absolute value in this range is in s = 0, (i.e. it equals A
as deﬁned in equation 55) by showing that −A/B > 1.






 is positive and depends positively
on s, hence the smallest value for the corner solution is in the lower endpoint of the














2(1 + α)(α + 2)
2 (3α + 2)
2
α(4 + 3α)(2 + 2α + α2)
has for α = 0 a unique minimum in α0 = 0,70241 with f(α0) = 25,084, which completes
the proof.
Proof of welfare results for exogenous ad valorem tax (Section 5.1)







a(κ − 1)(κ2α + 2κ − 2) − (a − cb)κ(κ − 2)(1 + ακ) − 2κbs(κ − 2)
(1 + ακ)
2
For κ 5 2 and thus κ − 2 5 0, the numerator is positive (note that κ > 1).







leads to a positive lower boundary of the derivative
d
ds
w. (If s is larger, the
arbitrage condition is not binding and markets are segmented).
25Parameter values for the numerical simulation for an endogenous ad valorem
tax (Section 5.2)
The parameters a and b can be normalised to a = 10 and b = 1 by rescaling the quantity
units and the ”monetary units” or the numeraire, in which prices are measured.
The model was then solved numerically for the six combinations of the parameter values
c = 4 and c = 8, and α = 0.2, α = 0.6 and α = 1.
In each case, the optimal tax rate is numerically determined as a function of s (for a
grid on the whole range of s where markets are not segmented and including the endoge-
nously determined threshold between the interior and the corner solution), and the prices,
quantities and welfare functions determined therefrom.
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